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I. INTRODUCTION
Almost forty years after the enactment of Title VII, women's struggle for
equality in the workplace continues. Although Title VII was intended to "break[]
down old patterns of segregation and hierarchy," the American workplace remains
largely gender-segregated. 2 Indeed, more than one-third of all women workers are
employed in occupations in which the percentage of women exceeds 80%. 3 Even
in disciplines in which women have made gains, top status (and top paying) jobs
remain male-dominated while the lower status jobs are filled by women.4 This
pattern of gender segregation, in turn, accounts for a substantial part of the persis-
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. A.B. Princeton University, 1986;
J.D. Harvard Law School, 1990. I would like to thank Professor Jennifer Wriggins for inviting
me to participate in this symposium and the editors of the Maine Law Review for their extraor-
dinary efforts both in organizing the symposium and in editing this essay.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). Title VII provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportu-
nities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (2000).
2. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628 (1986) (quoting United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979)).
3. See Barbara H. Wootton, Gender Differences in Occupational Employment, MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 15 (Apr. 1997).
In the 1980s, approximately 60% of all male and female workers would have been required
to switch to occupations atypical for their sex in order to achieve integration. See, e.g., JERRY A.
JACOBS, REVOLVING DOORS: SEX SEGREGATION AND WOMEN'S CAREERS 10, 28-29 (1989). These
estimates nevertheless tend to understate sex segregation because even women in occupations
that are relatively integrated tend to be segregated within departments and jobs that are segre-
gated. See, e.g., Williams T. Bielby & James N. Baron, A Woman's Place is with Other Women:
Sex Segregation Within Organizations, in SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS, EXPLA-
NATIONS, REMEDIES 27 (Barbara F Reskin ed., 1984). More recent studies indicate that, while
women made some gains during the last decade, gender segregation remains the norm for work-
ing women. See Wootton supra, at 15 (noting that "despite these shifts, women and men still
tend to be concentrated in different disciplines"). Moreover, occupational data collected by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics does not reveal gender differences within broadly-defined occupa-
tions or within firms. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, infra note 4.
4. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN'S EARNINGS IN 2001, at 1, 2 (2002) (noting
that "[a]lthough professional specialty occupations were the highest paid for women, men were
much more likely to be employed in the highest paying professions .... In contrast, women
were more likely to work in lower paying professional occupations").
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tent wage gap between men and women.5 As of the end of 2001, women working
full-time still earned only seventy-six cents for every dollar earned by their male
counterparts. 6 Thus, we have not only the persistence of job segregation, but job
segregation with particular implications for equality-men are on top and remain
there.
The central question addressed by this essay is "Why?" Why has gender seg-
regation of the work force persisted so stubbornly in the face of Title VII and
myriad state antidiscrimination statutes? Part II explores the relationship between
our common understanding of discrimination and the continuation of gender seg-
regation. This Part suggests that the elimination of discrimination as it has been
defined under Title VII might well leave undisturbed a significant amount of gen-
der segregation, regarding it as a product of individual choice rather than work-
place bias. Part III explores the operation of this rhetoric of choice in specific
examples from Title VII doctrine. Part IV turns to feminist critiques of the concept
of individual choice or agency. This Part suggests that, although feminists have
called into question assumptions about women's agency under patriarchy, these
critiques have been too limited in the Title VII context. The essay concludes by
suggesting ways in which feminist critiques of agency might be brought to bear
more effectively in a challenge to workplace segregation.
II. GENDER SEGREGATION AND GROuP-BLINDNESS
One answer to the question as to why gender segregation has been so resistant
to antidiscrimination law is that those laws have simply been inadequately en-
forced. 7 According to this theory, continuing gender segregation is a result of old-
fashioned discrimination by employers in the hiring and promotion of women.8
Without intending to downplay the importance of this explanation, this essay sug-
gests a more complex analysis by first asking whether and why one might expect
5. See, e.g., William J. Carrington & Kenneth R. Troske, Sex Segregation in U.S. Manufac-
turing, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 445 (1998) (finding that differential pay across gender segre-
gated establishments can statistically account for a substantial fraction of the overall gender pay
gap).
6. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, supra note 4, at 1.
7. Another response to the question regarding the persistence of gender segregation in the
wake of Title VII is that the statute was never intended to eliminate segregation as such. Indeed,
the statute included a provision expressly exempting employers from liability based on imbal-
ance in their work forces. Section 7030) of the Act reads:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to require any employer
... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of
an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of per-
sons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer..
• in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in
the'available work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2000). Since its enactment in 1964, this provision was modified in very
minor respects in 1972.
8. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretation of
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Defense, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1750 (1990) [hereinafter Schultz, Telling Stories] (arguing that the segregation of
women into lower paying, lower status jobs is a product of illegal discrimination rather than
women's preferences).
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gender segregation to disappear if discrimination were eliminated. Answering this
question depends, in turn, on one's definition of discrimination.
In the United States, antidiscrimination law is commonly understood as tar-
geting a particular and relatively narrow harm-namely, invidious or at least inac-
curate judgments about the worth of individuals based on certain characteristics. 9
With the specific and increasingly limited exception of affirmative action, 10 the
Supreme Court has at least rhetorically embraced a standard of group-blindness.
The Court has explained that "in passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but
momentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and national origin are not rel-
evant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees." 11 Hence, an
employer may not take "gender into account in making employment decisions...
Gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.", 12
At the same time, despite its insistence that gender be treated as irrelevant to
employment decisions, the Supreme Court has never embraced the idea that gen-
der-based characteristics are in fact irrelevant. Indeed, even while striking down
gender-based classifications, the Court has acknowledged that differences between
men and women exist and are a "cause for celebration."' 13 Moreover, these differ-
ences may operate to the relative advantage of men or women as a group under
different circumstances. Thus, in United States v. Virginia,14 Justice Ginsburg
acknowledged that even a facially gender neutral admissions policy at the Virginia
Military Institute will likely screen out more women than men. 15 The Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment merely requires that the state avoid
the assumption that particular characteristics necessarily track biological sex. Under
Title VII, an employer may justify facially neutral standards that have a negative
impact on women by showing business necessity. 16
These two premises, that employment decisions must be gender-blind and
that gender-based differences nonetheless matter, have important implications for
the relationship among antidiscrimination law, sex discrimination, and sex segre-
gation. Imagine a world in which surface gender identity, maleness or femaleness,
could be easily and effectively concealed from an employer: upon entering the
9. For an interesting argument regarding the logic of American antidiscrimination law, see
Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Anti-discrimination Law, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2000) (explaining that antidiscrimination law seeks to neutralize widespread
forms of prejudice that pervasively disadvantage persons based on inaccurate judgments about
their worth or capacities).
10. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979) (upholding
voluntary affirmative action policy against a challenge under Title VII).
11. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
12. Id. at 239-40. The Court has been even more explicit and stringent in its application of a
group-blindness standard in the context of race, particularly in equal protection doctrine. See,
e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204-05 (1995) (striking down minority
preference system in federal government contracts).
13. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
14. Id.
15. See id. at 542 (noting that the question is "whether the Commonwealth can constitution-
ally deny to women who have the will and capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that
VMI uniquely affords"). See also id. at 550 n.19 (conceding only that "admitting women to
VMI would undoubtedly require alterations necessary to afford members of each sex privacy
from the other sex in living arrangements, and to adjust aspects of the physical training pro-
grams").
16. See infra text accompanying notes 26-30.
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workplace employees lose their physically-manifested gender identity and regain
it when they leave. 17 In a literal sense, employer decisions in such a world would
necessarily be gender-blind; and yet, gender segregation across occupations and
industries might persist for several reasons. First, personal attributes relevant to
the performance of a particular job may be distributed unequally across genders.
The clearest examples of this would be physical attributes such as height, weight,
strength, or speed. An unequal distribution of such attributes would not justify per
se exclusion of one gender or another; however, the inclusion of a height require-
ment, for example, would mean that either women (in the case of a minimum
requirement) or men (in the case of a maximum requirement) would be dispropor-
tionately screened out of the positions. 18
Second, skills or aptitudes, whether acquired or innate, might be distributed
unequally across gender lines. For example, women, as a group, may acquire
care-based skills because they tend to bear a greater responsibility for domestic
care taking.19 Such responsibilities also impose on women opportunity costs in
terms of acquiring other types of skills, including higher education, or occupa-
tional or professional training. Although the causal relationship is complex, and
certainly not free of gendered norms within the culture, so long as a pattern exists
along gender lines, the pattern may be reflected in work place segregation. Fi-
nally, and more generally, cultural expectations about the nature of certain jobs
perpetuate gender segregation by influencing individuals to make occupational
choices along gender lines. 20
The current model of discrimination as group-blindness ascribes none of these
causes of gender segregation to employer wrongdoing. From the standpoint of
intentional discrimination, so long as the employer makes decisions without re-
gard to the sex of otherwise similarly situated persons, he has not violated his
obligation of neutrality, whatever his actual pattern of hiring. 2 1 Yet, even in the
absence of intentional discrimination, gendered employment patterns may arise
17. Professor Robert Post offers the example of gender blind orchestra auditions in which the
musician is concealed by a screen and evaluated only by her sound. Post, supra note 9, at 14-16.
18. For example, the Alabama Board of Corrections's height and weight requirements at
issue in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) screened out 40% of women but less than
1% of men applicants for the job of prison guard. Although Diane Rawlinson successfully
challenged these criteria as violating Title VII, she relied upon a disparate impact theory rather
than a theory of intentional discrimination. Id. at 328-29. The Supreme Court upheld the dis-
trict court's finding that the requirements were not justified by business necessity. Id. at 336-37.
19. Recent studies reveal that women still do 80% of child care and two-thirds of housework.
See, e.g., JOHN P. ROBINSON & GEOFFREY GODBEY, TIME FOR LIFE: THE SURPRISING WAYS AMERICANS
USE THEIR TIME 104-05 tbl.3 (1997) (charting trends in family care, by gender and employment,
in hours per week, for those aged 18-64 from 1965-1985 in the United States).
20. See generally Margaret Mooney Marini & Mary C. Brinton, Sex Typing in Occupational
Socialization, in SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS, EXPLANATIONS, REMEDIES 192 (Bar-
bara F. Reskin ed., 1984) (discussing gender differences evident in the work aspirations of ado-
lescents and young adults).
21. See Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L. J. 2009, 2028-30 (1995). Disparate impact analysis, in contrast,
does not require a showing of discriminatory intent and may in fact require employers to take
into account group-based characteristics or order to counteract unnecessary discriminatory im-
pact. Id. at 2019.
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either from "naturally" occurring gender differences or the (incidentally gendered)
choices of individuals. 22 Under some circumstances, the former may be regarded
as a cause for remedy or redistribution. Both the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA),2 3 and to a lesser extent Title VII, take this approach. 24 The ADA obliges
employers affirmatively to accommodate the particular needs of persons with dis-
abilities, a departure from a group-blindness norm. 25 Title VII imposes on em-
ployers a heavier burden of justification for policies that disadvantage particular
groups. 2 6
In contrast, differences resulting from private choice are almost never regarded
as giving rise to a remedy. 27 Indeed, whether a gendered characteristic can be
understood as a product of individual choice rather than innate differences very
often will determine whether an employer bears any responsibility to compensate
for that difference in making employment decisions. In short, choice becomes the
touchstone of responsibility under this model. The next Part explores the ways in
which the rhetoric of choice has come to limit the reach of Title VII both in dispar-
ate impact and disparate treatment contexts.
III. TrrILE VII AND THE RHETORIC OF CHOICE
A. Disparate Impact
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 28 the case in which the Court first articulated
the di sparate impact rationale for employer liability, the Court explained:
Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the better
qualified simply because of minority origins. Far from disparaging job qualifica-
tions as such, Congress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so
that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant. What Congress has
commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for the job and not the
person in the abstract. 29
22. Id.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).25. The ADA's definition of "discriminate" includes "not making reasonable accommoda-
tions" for the employee's disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
26. See infra at pp. 251-52 (discussing disparate impact litigation and the obligations im-
posed on employers under Title VII).
27. The exception that proves the rule may be religious worship. Although religion is not"immutable" in the way that sex and race are assumed to be, nevertheless it is not treated as
discretionary and is subject to change in order to accommodate employment obligations. More-
over, since 1972, Title VII has specifically required employers to accommodate employees'
religious practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). This accommodation provision has prompted
some to argue by analogy that Title VII should be amended to accommodate parenting obliga-
tions as well. See Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of
Work-Family Conflict: Lessons From Religious Accommodations, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 1443, 1445
(arguing that "religious accommodation case law has much to offer to the development of alegal paradigm that can promote parenting as a social good that deserves greater workplace
support"); but see Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title Vii, 76 TEx. L. REv. 317, 321 (1997) (noting that
religious plaintiffs "lose most of the time")..
28. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
29. Id. at 436.
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And yet, the test as applied requires employers to act in a sufficiently group-con-
scious way so as to remove obstacles that, although applied evenhandedly to all,
affect particular groups in an unequal way. Thus, in theory, for the employer to act
in a gender neutral way requires something other than complete indifference to the
gender of employees or job applicants. It requires the creation of a workplace and
hiring system that does not unnecessarily and unduly burden applicants or em-
ployees based on sex.30 The effect of this standard on gender segregation de-
pends, however, on often implicit assumptions about the nature of gender identity
and the scope of employee choice.
Consider how this works in practice. In a disparate impact case, the plaintiff's
prima facie case requires a showing that a facially neutral employment practice
has a disproportionately adverse impact on a protected class.3 1 Once that thresh-
old is reached, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to demonstrate that
the challenged practice is job-related and justifiable as a matter of business neces-
sity.3 2 Finally, the plaintiff has an opportunity to prove that there exists an alterna-
tive practice that would serve the employer's objectives equally well but have a
less severe adverse effect. 33 The plaintiff must also identify a particular employ-
ment practice (or inseparable cluster of practices) claimed to have caused the dis-
parate effect. 34
From the plaintiff's perspective, an important virtue of a disparate impact claim
is that it does not depend upon a showing of discriminatory intent. In other words,
proof of disparate impact is sufficient to establish liability unless the defendant
can prove that the hiring process is justified by business necessity.3 5 This means
that the employer has an obligation to alter hiring and promotion practices that
burden women, for example, whether or not those practices were adopted for the
purpose of maintaining a segregated workplace.
So defined, the disparate impact theory of liability seems promising as a basis
for attacking some of the reasons for persistent gender segregation cited above. 36
For example, if the expectation of overtime hours prevents employees from ad-
vancing if they have substantial childcare obligations and this leads to gender seg-
regation, keeping women in lower ranking positions, the employer might be re-
quired to justify the overtime rule as business necessity.37 Alternatively, if the use
30. For an interesting argument that the 1991 Civil Rights Act effected a shift from a color-
blindness to an accommodationist standard, see Flagg, supra note 21, at 2013-15.
31. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (holding that liability is established
when facially neutral policy affects members of protected class in significantly discriminatory
manner); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
32. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 523-24 (1993) (noting that once the
plaintiff establishes disparate impact, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove busi-
ness necessity).
33. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 425 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
34. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
35. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress assigned the burden of persuasion to the defen-
dant on the issue of business necessity. By doing so, Congress made clear that a plaintiff can
prevail without demonstrating discriminatory intent on the part of the employer. See Flagg,
supra note 21, at 2024-25.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 7-23.
37. For a discussion of the potential (and potential difficulties) of such a suit, see Joan Will-
iams, Market Work and Family Work in the 21st Century, 44 VILL. L. REV. 305 (1999); but see
Mary Becker, Caring for Children and Caretakers, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1495, 1517-21 (ex-
pressing skepticism toward the potential for expanding Title VII given the difficulties facing
plaintiffs under current doctrine and hostility of federal courts toward Title VII claims).
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of informal networking as a means of identifying, hiring, and promoting candi-
dates disadvantages women, the employer might be forced by a disparate impact
claim to investigate other, equally effective but less discriminatory recruitment
practices. 3 8
In practice, however, plaintiffs have faced a number of obstacles. First, in
order to establish a prima facie case under disparate impact, the plaintiff must
identify a specific employment practice (or inseparable group of practices) respon-
sible for the identified disparity, and demonstrate a causal connection between the
two. 39 For example, a plaintiff might challenge an employer's use of a standard-
ized test as a screen for hiring by showing that women tend to score lower on the
test than men and are therefore disproportionately screened out of the process at an
early stage. The plaintiff would rely on test results to prove the link between the
practice and the gender disparity. If a plaintiff sought to establish that the absence
of parent-friendly policies disproportionately affected women's advancement, she
would have a much more difficult time for several reasons. First, the argument
attacks the absence of affirmative policies rather that the existence of a particular
barrier. Yet, as Nancy Dowd has argued, "[d]iscrimination analysis is designed to
ensure that no one is denied an equal opportunity within the existing structure; it is
not designed to change the structure to the least discriminatory, most opportunity-
maximizing pattern." 40 Hence, challenging the absence of a beneficial policy is
much more difficult for plaintiffs than challenging the existence of a discrimina-
tory one.
Second, although the plaintiff might rely on expert testimony to show that
women on average bear more responsibility for childcare and that this, in turn,
affects their ability to work overtime, such testimony would likely be based on
general population statistics rather than on the particular work force at issue. Yet,
in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,4 1 the Supreme Court required the disparate
impact plaintiff to make a more precise showing regarding the challenged practice
and the pattern of employment. 4 2 Following Ward's Cove, some courts have re-
38. Courts have held that disparate impact, as well as disparate treatment analysis, may beused in cases involving subjective criteria. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
990-91 (1988); Rowe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 457 F2d 348, 358 (5th Cir. 1972).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(i) provides:
With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a
disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall dem-onstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate im-
pact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the ele-
ments of a respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation foranalysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.
There is an additional exception:
When a decision-making process includes particular, functionally-integrated prac-
tices which are components of the same criterion, standard, method of administration,
or test, such as the height and weight requirements designed to measure strength in
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the particular, functionally-integrated
practices may be analyzed as one employment practice.
137 CONG. REC. S 15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
40. Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimi-
nation Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 139 (1989)
(emphasis added).
41. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
42. Id. at 656.
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quired plaintiffs to establish such an impact based on the individuals in an employer's
workforce as opposed to the broader population. 43 Thus, the plaintiff in our hypo-
thetical might be required to prove that women applicants for employment or ad-
vancement were actually deterred by the overtime rule relative to men applicants,
a costly and difficult task.
Assume, however, that our plaintiff is capable of showing a disparate impact
on women. It is still far from clear that she will succeed in shifting the burden to
the employer to prove business necessity. Whether she succeeds may depend upon
the extent to which the court views conformity to gender roles as a matter of indi-
vidual choice. In many cases, courts have denied disparate impact claims when
they regard the impact as within the control of the claimant. The clearest examples
of such analysis may be cases involving employee grooming. For example, in
Rogers v. American Airlines,44 a court rejected an argument of a black woman
plaintiff that the employer's rule against braided hair was discriminatory.45 The
court suggested that even if discriminatory impact could be established, the em-
ployer should not be held liable because the alleged impact resulted from the
employee's own choice.46 Similarly, courts may view an argument regarding the
gender-based impact of overtime requirements as a product of the private choices
of individual women. Parents make decisions regarding the allocation of childcare
responsibilities. Even if those choices track a broader gender pattern, the em-
ployer does not bear responsibility for accommodating them.
B. Disparate Treatment
A plaintiff may challenge a gender-segregated workplace under a disparate
treatment theory of discrimination as well. In a disparate treatment claim, the
employee alleges that the pattern of gender segregation results from intentional
discrimination on the part of the employer. Unlike with a disparate impact claim,
the plaintiff need not isolate a particular hiring mechanism that resulted in the
segregation, but she must establish that the discrimination was intentional.4 7
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,48 the Supreme Court established the
basic framework for establishing a disparate treatment claim.4 9 The plaintiff must
present a prima facie showing of discrimination, essentially a showing that she
applied for a position for which she was qualified and was turned down in favor of
a male candidate in the case of gender discrimination. 50 Once the plaintiff makes
this showing, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a non-
discriminatory reason for the decision. 5 1 The plaintiff then has an opportunity to
43. Compare EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that
workforce statistics are a necessary element of a disparate impact claim), with Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (accepting population statistics regarding the average
height of women and men as establishing the disparate impact of minimum height and weight
requirements).
44. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
45. Id. at 231.
46. Id. at 232-33.
47. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 802-05.
50. Id. at 802.
51. Id. at 802-05.
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demonstrate that the defendant's proffered reason is actually a pretext for discrimi-
nation.52 This entails more than simply showing that the reason is false; she must
show that the real reason for the decision was gender.53
Given this basic framework, imagine a woman plaintiff who applied for a
position in an area overwhelmingly staffed by men. The employer denies her ap-
plication and hires a man for the job. Based on these facts alone, the plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The employer then points to differ-
ences between the qualifications of the plaintiff and the male applicant as a justifi-
cation for the employment decision. The plaintiff responds by citing the pattern of
gender segregation in the workplace as evidence of intentional discrimination against
women. What is the court to make of this evidence?
The answer depends to a large degree on one's expectations regarding gender
integration in the absence of deliberate discrimination by an employer. As in the
disparate impact context, case law reveals a willingness on the part of judges to
accept a benign explanation of gender segregation rooted in the voluntary choices
of women and men rather than conclude that segregation is a product of discrimi-
natory actions by the employer.54
Perhaps the most notorious example of such reasoning can be found in EEOC
v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co.55 In the Sears case, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) claimed that Sears had discriminated against women in the
hiring of employees for commissioned sales jobs.56 The EEOC argued that Sears
had preferred men for the higher paying commissioned jobs while relegating women
to noncommission jobs paying an hourly wage. 57 In support of its claim, the EEOC
presented statistical evidence that women who had applied for sales jobs were
significantly less likely than men to be hired for commission jobs. 58 In its de-
fense, Sears argued that the preferences of the applicants could account for the
gender disparity in hiring practices. 59 Indeed, the district court found that women
"disliked the perceived 'dog-eat-dog' competition" of the commission jobs and
preferred the more secure, noncompetitive atmosphere of the wage-based sales
jobs.60
52. Id. at 804-05.
53. See id. at 805; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993)
(stating that ultimate question for trier of fact is whether plaintiff has proved discrimination on
basis of race).
54. Vicki Schultz has called this the "lack of interest" defense. Vicki Schultz & Stephen
Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense
in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. Cm. L. REV. 1073, 1076 (1992). She
explains that "employers seek to rationalize the patterns of segregation revealed by statistical
evidence by arguing that such patterns resulted not from discrimination, but from protected
class members' own lack of interest in the higher-paying jobs in which they are underrepresented."
Id. (documenting courts' willingness to accept the lack of interest defense, particularly in gender
discrimination cases but increasingly in race discrimination cases as well).
55. 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1305-08, 1352-53 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
56. Id. at 1278.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1296-98. Between 1973 and 1980, for example, women comprised 61% of all full-
time sales applicants at Sears, but only 27% of those hired into commissioned sales jobs. See
Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n as Appellant at 7, EEOC v. Sears, Roe-
buck, & Co., 839 F2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (Nos. 86-1519 and 86-1621).
59. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 628 F. Supp. at 1305.
60. Id. at 1307.
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As the Sears case makes clear, the ideology of choice offers an alternative
understanding of sex segregation that undermines women's claims of discrimina-
tion. This happens in two ways. First, the possibility that gender segregation
emerges as a product of women's choices undermines a plaintiff's ability to rely
on statistical proof. Instead of simply showing a clear pattern created by employ-
ers' preferences and practices, the plaintiff must counter judicial assumptions about
women's desire for certain types of work. Second, even assuming that women's
preferences account for some part of gender segregation, the ideology of choice
constructs those preferences as preexisting the workplace. The model does not
allow for the possibility that women's preferences may be shaped at least in part
by a pattern of discrimination for which the employer is directly responsible.
As these examples suggest, a strong conception of employee choice or agency
constrains the scope of employer liability under both disparate impact and dispar-
ate treatment models of discrimination and, in turn, limits the effectiveness of anti-
discrimination law in dismantling workplace segregation. Relying on the rhetoric
of choice, courts regard segregated employment patterns as a product of individual
preference rather than illegal discrimination.
IV. TrrLE VII, WOMEN'S CHOICES, AND FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
The limitations on the effectiveness of Title VII that stem from the embrace
by courts of a liberal model of individual choice and state (or employer) neutrality
seem a particularly ripe target for feminist critique. After all, feminists have long
argued that the self that lies at the heart of liberal theory embodies assumptions
about the scope of individual choice or agency that does not comport with women's
selves under patriarchy.6 1 Accordingly, feminists have begun to examine in a range
of different contexts the implications of an alternative conception of the self, one
that assumes that women's (and men's) choices are both socially constructed and
gendered. 62 This Part reviews this work very briefly and then explores the impli-
cations of the analysis for gender segregation in the workplace with particular
focus on the recently rekindled debate over the allocation of the costs of care work.63
61. Even a liberal theorist like Mary Wollstonecraft recognized the significance of social
constraints on gender roles. She wrote: "I will venture to affirm, that a girl, whose spirits have
not been damped by inactivity, or innocence tainted by false shame, will always be a romp, and
the doll will never excite attention unless confinement allows her no alternative." Mary
Wollstonecraft, The Same Subject Continued, in VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN 123, 129
(Miriam Brody Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 1978) (1792).
62. Feminist theorists sometimes express the relationship between the self and socially-con-
structive forces as the distinction between biological sex and culturally defined gender, a dis-
tinction perhaps first emphasized by Simone de Beauvoir in her claim: "One is not born, but
rather becomes, a woman. No biological, psychological, or economic fate determines the figure
that the human female presents in society; it is civilization as a whole that produces this creature
.... SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEx 267 (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Vintage Books
1989) (1949).
63. Of course, feminists have long studied the issue of work/family conflict. See, e.g., Wendy
W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate,
13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-85); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The
Case of Pregnancy, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality
Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986).
Professor Vicki Schultz's article Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000), seems to have
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The standard feminist critique of liberalism's assumptions about choice goes
something like this: Liberal theory assumes that individuals enjoy a relatively ro-
bust and undifferentiated capacity for choice. 64 This assumption, in turn, informs
economic theory, social policy, and conceptions of justice and fairness. 65 If, how-
ever, women and men are differently situated with respect to capacity for choice,
then facially neutral social policies premised on assumptions of equal agency will
in fact perpetuate gender hierarchy.66 Conversely, taking into account the ways in
which women are constrained differently from men can reveal situations in which
often unstated assumptions about responsibility and choice contribute to women's
inequality and suggest how public policy and law might best respond to such in-
equality.
Feminist accounts abound as to how, why, and to what extent women's choices
might be different from men's. Some have characterized women's limited agency
as a problem of patriarchy, broadly conceived. For example, Nancy Hirshmann
has suggested that patriarchal rules constitute "not only ... what women are al-
lowed to do but ... what they are allowed to be as well: how women are able to
think and conceive of themselves, what they can and should desire, what their
preferences are."'67 Others have focused on the role of the state. For example,
Catharine MacKinnon has argued that "[t]he State is male jurisprudentially, mean-
ing that it adopts the standpoint of male power on the relation between law and
society." 68 Elaborating on the mechanism of state power, Deborah Rhode has
suggested that "[t]he state does not simply respond to expressed desires; it plays an
active role in legitimating, suppressing, or redirecting them. Attempts to chal-
lenge inequality through conventional democratic measures fall short when subor-
dinate groups adapt or accommodate their preferences to the unequal opportuni-
ties available."'69 Still others have emphasized experiential differences between
men and women. For example, Robin West posits that "[liberalism's] descriptive
account of the phenomenology of choice... may be wildly at odds with the way
women phenomenologically experience the act of consent." 70
triggered another round of debate within feminist circles. See, e.g., Joan Williams, It's Snowing
Down South: How to Help Mothers and Avoid Recycling the Sameness/Difference Debate, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 812 (2002) (responding to Schultz's article); a number of articles included in the
Chicago-Kent Law Review's Symposium on Care Work, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1387 (2001).
64. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 29-35 (1993) (describing the subject of po-
litical liberalism as free in three respects: to determine their individual conceptions of the good;
to regard themselves as self-authenticating sources of valid claims; and to take responsibility for
their ends).
65. See id. at 33-34. Note that Rawls's third form of freedom explicitly links freedom (or
choice) and responsibility for ends, thereby defining a foundational conception of justice under
political liberalism. Id.
66. See, e.g., Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV.L. REV. 1657, 1696
(1997) (arguing that "the assumption that the self is adequately protected by negative liberties so
as to enable her full participation in both public and private life is problematic not because it is
inaccurate but because it implies a level of agency that, under patriarchy, may be more accurate
for men than for women").
67. See Nancy J. Hirschmann, Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom, 24 POL. THEORY 46, 52
(1996).
68. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 163 (1989).
69. Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1189 (1994).
70. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique
of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 92 (1987). West explains the implications of
her assumptions as follows:
[I]f women "consent" to transactions not to increase our own welfare, but to increase
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Whatever the foundation, these theoretical insights have yielded doctrinal and
political critiques focusing on issues ranging from constitutional theory to crimi-
nal law.7 1 Curiously, however, the application of feminist critiques of agency to
Title VII has been relatively limited. Kathryn Abrams has explored the possibility
of applying a concept of women's limited agency as a means of interpreting the
factual predicate of "unwelcomeness" in a sexual harassment claim under Title
VII. 72 Specifically, she suggests that "[miaking ... constrained forms of resis-
tance visible in the context of sexual harassment trials would enhance women's
ability to show pervasiveness or respond to evidence regarding their clothing or
demeanor."'7 3 More broadly, Martha Chamallas has begun to explore the potential
implications of structural and cultural domination theories to Title VII, noting that
"[r]esearch of the last two decades supports the view that differences in the moti-
vations or choices of individuals cannot adequately explain ... persistent patterns
of tokenism and segregation."'74 Her analysis of cultural domination theory, how-
ever, is, like Abrams's, confined to sexual harassment cases.7 5
With these limited-though important--exceptions, feminists have left largely
unassailed the liberal paradigm connecting responsibility and choice in Title VII
doctrine. Indeed, although feminists often disagree on the fairness and effective-
ness of employment policy alternatives, much feminist work on employment policy
tends to assume rather than to disrupt the underlying liberal assumption connect-
ing choice and fairness.
For example, feminists have recently renewed their focus on "care work,"
defined as the work of caring for the family, especially children, and the burden
such work imposes on women's performance in the paid labor force. In the current
debate over policy alternatives, the concept of social construction tends to be sub-
ordinate to the standard paradigm of choice. This is surprising given that the de-
bate over care work implicates rather directly the issues of women's agency with
respect to the acquisition of human capital, job choice, and attachment to the
workforce. Yet, feminists whose work has been among the most important and
influential in this area have not fully exploited theories of limited agency devel-
oped in other contexts. Instead, most seem to assume, if only implicitly, the liberal
model prioritizing individual choice.
the welfare of others-if women are "different" in this psychological way-then the
liberal's ethic of consent, with its presumption of an essentially selfish human (male)
actor and an essentially selfish consensual act, when even-handedly applied to both
genders, will have disastrous implications for women.
Id.
71. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 66, at 1662-70 (discussing implications of women's limited
agency for constitutional theory); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Rede-
fining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 34-43 (1991) (discussing women's agency
under conditions of oppression in the context of domestic violence).
72. Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95
COLtJM. L. REV. 304, 364-66 (1995).
73. Id. at 365-66.
74. Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some
Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370, 2372 (1999).
75. See id. at 2402-09.
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For example, in her important work on gender segregation and the lack of
interest defense,76 Professor Vicki Schultz rejects the idea that job aspirations and
preference pre-exist women's entry into the marketplace.77 Instead, she begins
from an insight regarding the social construction of women's work choices through
workplace conditions and employer policies. 7 8 In Schultz's view, "[slex segrega-
tion persists not because most women bring to the workworld fixed preferences
for traditionally female jobs, but rather because employers structure opportunities
and incentives and maintain work cultures and relations so as to disempower most
women from aspiring to and succeeding in traditionally male jobs."'79 Schultz
acknowledges that men and women are socialized differently from a young age
but contends that this socialization is not monolithic. 80 Rather, women's prefer-
ences change in response to the marketplace and the workplace, and continue to
change throughout their lives. 8 1
On one hand, Schultz seems to embrace a thoroughgoing notion of social con-
struction meant to challenge what might otherwise appear to be the autonomous,
agentic expression of preference by women for certain types of jobs and career
paths. On the other hand, she seeks to shift responsibility to the employer for
imposing constraints on women's choices. Given the liberal premises of Title VII,
she must characterize the construction of women's preferences as a departure from
employer neutrality rather than a product of women's agency. Thus, Schultz re-
treats from her more subtle social constructionist assumptions to revive a notion of
agency that fits more easily within the liberal paradigm, insisting that women "act
reasonably and strategically within the constraints of their organizational posi-
tions in an effort to make the best of them."'82
Schultz's implicit acceptance of the liberal paradigm underlying Title VII is
reflected in her selection of examples of the ways employers construct women's
work preferences. Schultz focuses on two issues: low expectations for advance-
ment and promotion in traditionally female jobs; and proprietary expectations in
male-dominated jobs (often translated into sexual harassment in the workplace). 83
Significantly, in this early work she does not talk about the way the workplace
affects women as mothers or simply as workers with disproportionate domestic
responsibilities.
76. Schultz's work in this area includes Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 8; Schultz &
Petterson, supra note 54; Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000) [hereinafter Schultz,
Life's Work].
77. See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 8, at 1756. She argues that "[bly assuming that
women form stable job aspirations before they begin working, courts have missed the ways in
which employers contribute to creating women workers in their images of who 'women' are
supposed to be." Id.
78. Id. at 1757 (noting that "women develop their work preferences only in the context of and
in response to structural features of the workworld itself").
79. Id. at 1816.
80. Id. at 1816-17.
81. See id. at 1821-22.
82. Id. at 1825.
83. Id. at 1827-39.
[Vol. 55:1
2002] SEGREGATION, GENDER BLINDNESS, EMPLOYEE AGENCY 255
In her more recent work, Schultz has addressed the issue of care work if only
to deny or downplay its role in structuring women's employment choices. In Life's
Work, Schultz criticizes a particular feminist response to the work/family problem,
which she terms "family wage ideology." 84 Schultz explains such "ideology" as
follows: "[iun policy terms, [family wage thinking] finds expression in the propo-
sition that it is women's position within families, rather than the workworld, that is
the primary cause of women's economic disadvantage, and hence should be the
primary locus for redistributive efforts."'85 Schultz disagrees. Citing various em-
pirical studies, she insists that women's job segregation and lack of attachment to
the work force is a product of employment discrimination rather than dispropor-
tionate domestic responsibilities. 86 According to Schultz's reading of this litera-
ture, "socially-constructed features of the workworld help create the very gender
differences (manifested in work aspirations, employment patterns, and familial
divisions of labor) that human capital theory attributes to women themselves." 87
Feminist proposals for joint property or for paid housework, Schultz insists, sim-
ply reify the gender specific allocation of responsibilities within families and gen-
der segregation of the work force. 88 In other words, forces other than women's
preferences for paid work versus care work determine the balance women strike
between the two. Given a choice, Schultz implies, women's work patterns would
be similar to men's.
Professor Joan Williams, another important participant in this debate, offers a
different account of women's choices with respect to care work and paid work.89
In From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity, she argues that "[t]he institu-
tional arrangements people face in their work and family lives include, first, work-
places structured around an ideal worker who is not a primary caregiver." 90 Wil-
liams acknowledges that women may do more care work than men because they
have a preference for it.9 1 At the same time, Williams emphasizes the ways in
which women's choices with respect to care work and market work are constrained
by institutional structures both within the workplace and outside of it. She notes
that a "woman might well describe her decision to quit as [a] 'choice,' when what
she really means is that her employer is inflexible and her children's father should
help shoulder the responsibility of caring for them."'92 Or "a mother might well
84. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 76, at 1884 (defining family wage ideology as "'the sex/
gender/family system that prescribes earning as the sole responsibility of husbands and unpaid
domestic labor as the only proper long-term responsibility of women"') (quoting LINDA GORDON,
PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935, at 53 (1994)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1903-04.
87. Id. at 1904.
88. Id. at 1905-08.
89. Williams has written extensively in this area. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GEN-
DER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2000); Joan Williams, Market
Work and Family Work in the 21st Century, 44 VILL. L. REV. 305 (1999); Joan Williams, From
Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care As Work, Gender As Tradition, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1441 (2001); Joan Williams, It's Snowing Down South: How to Help Mothers and Avoid
Recycling the Sameness/Difference Debate, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 812 (2002) (responding to
Schultz's Life's Work, supra note 76).
90. Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity, supra note 89, at 1474.
91. Id. at 1475.
92. Id.
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say she wishes she could quit-when what she really means is that she wishes she
had high-quality childcare. ' '9 3 Hence, she does not disagree with Schultz that
workplace factors influence women's choices. Rather, she simply emphasizes that
other factors such as family dynamics, norms of domesticity, or even women's
preferences play a role as well.
In her essay How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions about Where,
Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted,94 Professor
Mary Ann Case takes yet a third approach. The essay does not directly address the
issue of gender segregation in the workplace and its connection to women's care
work. Rather, Case criticizes proposals (made by others including Joan Williams)
to shift the responsibility and cost of caring for children away from parents and to
employers or the state.95 Nevertheless, her fairness-based arguments reveal an
underlying account of women's agency with respect to care work and market work.
To a much greater extent than either Schultz or Williams, Case is willing to assume
that parents make relatively unencumbered choices regarding family creation and
the care work that comes with those obligations. She does not focus on the alloca-
tion of responsibility between fathers and mothers except to say that men's resis-
tance to taking on more care work must be overcome. 96 Emphasizing the inequal-
ity between men who have children (and wives to care for them) and childless
women, Case insists that shifting the costs of care work done primarily by women
to the employer, for example, will result in a disproportionate burden on women
who have chosen not to take on those care responsibilities. 97
Notice how in each of these three accounts, the author's assumptions about
choice drive not only the story about care work and market work that she em-
braces, but the policy implications that flow from the story. Williams assumes that
preferences are socially constructed and gendered and that family arrangements
are relatively fixed. In other words, she takes for granted that people will have
children and that the work of caring for them must get done.9 8 These assumptions
lead her to the conclusion that accommodation of care work is appropriate and
93. Id.
94. Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions about Where,
Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should be Shifted, 76 CHl.-KENT L. REV. 1753
(2001).
95. See id. at 1957 (criticizing Williams for her failure to acknowledge that "in female-
dominated jobs, like those so many women occupy, 'the existing employee' on whom the 'ex-
cess work' resulting from schedules favoring mothers on the job is 'dump[ed]' are other women,
most likely women without children").
96. Id. at 1756.
97. Id. at 1756-62.
98. Williams makes this assumption explicitly and strategically as a way of bridging the gap
between feminist advocating integrationist approaches and women who continue to define them-
selves largely in terms of domesticity. Joan Williams, supra note 63, at 829. Williams explains
that:
If the goal is to create an effective coalition to improve the economic position of
women, one key is to bridge the divide between women with a workplace identity and
women without one. This requires an empathetic stance in which women identified
with a job are open to the truths of women without jobs, and family-identified women
are open to truths of women who retain commitments both to family work and market
work.
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just. For Williams, a variety of social forces combine to deprive women of choice
and therefore the cost of a remedy is justly allocated broadly.
Schultz, like Williams, acknowledges that women's choices are constrained,
but she roots those constraints primarily in the discriminatory behavior of employ-
ers.99 Employment structures constrain women's choices and therefore the cost of
integrationist policies may be imposed justly on employers. 10 0 Her effort to
downplay other constructing forces outside the workplace seems to reflect a con-
cern that acknowledging such forces necessarily shifts responsibility from em-
ployers to women themselves. This conclusion follows, of course, only if one
accepts the liberal paradigm inevitably linking choice and responsibility.
In contrast, Case seems to assume that preferences reflected in family forma-
tion are fully an expression of individual choice. 10 1 Hence, any associated work-
place consequences are simply a product of that choice, not an unfair penalty or act
of discrimination. 10 2 Conversely, any reallocation of the costs of parenting may
be unjust to the extent that those costs are borne by workers who have made the
choice not to undertake such responsibilities. 10 3
Close reading of these works reveals at least two distinct uses of the concept
of choice in relation to public policy, one empirical and the other fairness-based.
The empirical strand considers why women make the choices that they make, or
how women's choices would change under a given policy or rule. The fairness/
justice strand ties the quality of choices available to women to the availability of a
remedy, asserting either that women lack choice and therefore deserve a remedy or
that women exercise choice and therefore must live with the consequences.
At times, Schultz and Williams seem to disagree over the empirical descrip-
tion of choice-what would women choose if their options were better all around?
For example, in Life's Work, Schultz criticizes feminists advocating a family-based
approach for "rely[ing] on the human capital literature to assert that it is women's
disproportionate responsibility for housework and child care that accounts for our
lower wages and our inferior position in the workplace. ' 104 Williams counters
99. See Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 76, at 1904.
100. Id. Emphasizing the role of work-based structures, Schultz explains:
[It] creates greater possibilities for change. If the sources of women's disadvantage
lie not in sociobiological force that commit women more heavily to child care and
housework but instead in the political economy of paid work, we can challenge the
sex bias in allegedly gender-neutral forces in labor markets and work places. We can
create more empowering gender arrangements by demanding work and working con-
ditions that will give women more economic security, more political clout, more house-
hold bargaining power, and perhaps even more personal strength with which to pur-
sue our dreams.
Id. at 1904-05.
101. Case's assumptions about the choice to become a parent or to assume care work is not
explicit but follows from her comparison of child care responsibilities to other uses of leisure
such as studying the history of feminism or writing poetry. See Case, supra note 94, at 1767.
102. Id. at 1754. Interestingly, Case's linking of choice and fairness with respect to the
accommodation of care responsibilities of children has the effect of privileging her own claim
for accommodation of the burden she bears in caring for her mother, a care burden that she has
accepted but not chosen. Id. Case describes this burden extensively in the notes of the piece.
Id. at 1754 n.5.
103. Id. at 1757-59.
104. Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 76, at 1903.
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that "[t]he important insight that workplace dynamics play a role in creating
women's employment preferences does not prove that workplace dynamics alone
account for women's economic position." 105 Williams also criticizes Schultz's
dichotomy between "'scholars [who] argue that women's economic disadvantage
arises from their primary commitment to their families' and scholars [(like Schultz
herself)] who argue that women's economic disadvantage arises 'from sexist dy-
namics in labor markets and firms.' 10 6
At other times, they seem to link the issue of choice to fairness, at least implic-
itly. For example, Schultz criticizes feminists and human capital theorists such as
Mary Becker for treating women as "inauthentic workers." 107 Such a charge,
however, depends upon the value judgment that the authentic worker is one whose
priority is wage work rather than any one of a range of other commitments. Will-
iams, in contrast, argues:
[T]he crucial point-politically, strategically, and ethically-is that a variety of
different social forces feed into the choices made by women, including not only
employer behavior but also the lack of social supports for childrearing and gen-
der performance norms. We need not adopt a simplistic model that employer
behavior alone creates women's "choices". We need only point out that every
choice currently available is deeply flawed .... 108
Case's use of choice, in contrast, is all about the justice strand. For example,
she cites a study revealing that women with children earn 73% of men's wages
while childless women earn 90% of men's wages. 109 Her question is "How do
you account for the other 10%?" Although this is an important question, Case's
overriding focus is on the consequences to childless women of efforts to reduce
the 27% wage gap suffered by women with children. 110 Case's priorities make
sense from a fairness standpoint only if one accepts a strong connection between
justice and individual choice. That is, for Case, the most aggrieved group in this
analysis is not the group with the lowest wages (mothers) but the group that has
chosen to avoid the obligations of motherhood and are nevertheless unjustly penal-
ized relative to men. 111
If feminist critiques of agency are correct, however, the exercise of choice is
deeply problematic on a moral level as a measure of fairness. On a practical level,
allocating the costs of care work according to a liberal model of choice is very
likely to operate to the systematic disadvantage of women. Of course, debates
over the empirical dimensions of women's exercise of choice within our culture
are necessary and productive to the extent that they yield insight into individuals'
likely responses to policy changes. How will women respond to policies recogniz-
ing the market value of housework within marriage? To what extent will enhanced
supports for parenting (work that is currently mostly done by women) reinforce
traditional patriarchal structures within marriage? These are obviously important
questions that need to be answered. At the same time, feminists must consciously
105. Joan Williams, supra note 63, at 824-25.
106. Id. at 824 (quoting Schultz, Life's Work, supra note 76, at 1900).
107. Shultz, Life's Work, supra note 76, at 1892-93.
108. Joan Williams, supra note 63, at 832-33.
109. Case, supra note 94, at 1759 n.17.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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and carefully separate these empirical questions from conceptions of justice that
link responsibility and choice. Feminists should begin instead from an assumption
that the concept of choice is deeply gendered and that justice-based theories that
deploy choice as a limit on redistribution will not lead to gender equality.
V. CONCLUSION
This essay has only begun to answer the question posed: Why has gender
segregation in the work force persisted so stubbornly in the face of Title VII? It
has suggested that the ideology of choice, in effect, detaches gender segregation
from gender discrimination by limiting the reach of both disparate impact and
disparate treatment theories under Title VII. Feminist conceptions of women's
unequal agency have helped to reveal the gendered implications of this ideology
of choice. Yet, feminist theorists must move beyond a focus on the ways in which
women's agency is circumscribed to challenge the underlying link between choice
and fairness. Breaking this link, in turn, may lead feminists to articulate alterna-
tive accounts of justice and human flourishing that are more likely to lead both to
gender integration and gender equality than those prevailing under our current
liberal model.
